NB: group of motorists desperate kindly asking alms oil)
The strike situation of employees in most major oil refineries, the strike resulting in a blockade of the outputs of refined fuels, augurs the possibility of a shortage of gasoline for most motorists who I am, the stations gradually being unable to renew their stocks.
As Dante wrote in Hell:
" Oh, she is nagging anxiety Driver's fuel shortage, looking for the grail diesel or unleaded, and ready to do battle with the CGT simplex homo, who in the early Frimat, and under the false pretext that he likes walking, finds nothing better than to march occasionally accompanied by thousands of similar (tens according to the prefecture of police) and to recover from his diabolical efforts , sleeping on fuel depots, but with one eye open, ready to pounce on the slightest scab ... "
[If someone comes to counting the number of commas in the preceding sentence, I sent him a caramel collect. Mostly I hope no one seriously believes that Dante wrote it, it's actually Victor Hugo in Les Miserables.]
The thing is, day after day, the media never stop not knocking our message, namely that the risk of fuel shortage is real, although the Government reiterates that there is no need to panic, and that is precisely a panic that would trigger the shortage.
Well for now, things seem to happen nicely, most stations have not forfeited and there seems to be no rush among distributors. However, since I have the opportunity to use my car every day, I must confess that I look with a touch of anxiety in the situation where I source stations regularly, waiting for messages "Out of Gas "or tonnage (no pun intended) the number of motorists filling their tanks, a queue fed giving the signal for a panic trying to develop. Therefore, my imagination probably much too rich considering the company collapsing and ending up in a death struggle to obtain a jerry can of gasoline, as in the post-apocalyptic world of Mad Max.
This kind of situation, which grows each time a paralysis of the road haulage threat applies to both fuel and foods, and we all remember the strike of 1993 during which total our (con) citizens heaped pounds of pasta, sugar and other items to survive in case of nuclear attack.
These phenomena of panic potential related to risk of default on supply basic necessities always make me think furiously to the phenomena of bank runs, a phenomenon brilliantly described in the book Kindleberger in 2000 on the history of financial crises and theoretically modeled by including Diamond & Dybvig 1983. These panics are a typical example of self-fulfilling prophecy, since it is precisely because an agent anticipates that he will trigger panic by withdrawing their savings (we'll use it with this description of the revolution, with its usual brilliance, by the poet Eric Cantona ) ....
Traditionally, the phenomenon of bank runs is modeled as a coordination game in which two equilibria are possible, one where everyone panics and withdraws its funds in a given bank (and therefore the logical first come first serve basis, and all investors will not be served) and one in which no panic (so no one withdraws its funds or to withdraw the last of the game if the horizon is finite). Clearly, this is interesting, but it's a bit of a response Normand, "perhaps have ben is that yes panic, but perhaps have well qu'non "...
Experimental economics is then very useful in those situations where the theory gives predictions of multiple, in that it allows to discriminate potentially empirically strategies adopted by players and try to understand their rationale.
Several experimental studies have been done on these phenomena, one of Madiès (2006), published in the Journal of Business , and one of Schotter and Yorulmazer in 2008 in the J ournal of Financial Intermediation .
Madiès In the study, one of the experiments is as follows. Groups of 10 participants must decide simultaneously to 30 times (rounds) for the period of withdrawal of their savings. If they withdraw all in period 2, each earns 45 ECUs. If they withdraw all in period 1, only 3 will be served, the bank became illiquid beyond 3. All three earn 40 ECU and the 7 others who have not withdrawn in period 1 win 0, whatever the time of withdrawal. In this game there is a Nash equilibrium Pareto-dominant one in which all 10 participants withdraw in period 2, well being are of 450 ECUs. There is another Nash equilibrium risk-dominant implies a lack of coordination, ie a situation in which the 10 participants withdraw in period 1, and where consequently the gain is 3 * 40 = 120 ECUs, with only 3 participants will served.
The results are partially "reassuring, in that the total panic (that is to say, situations in which the group of 10 investors withdrew their funds in period 1) are quite rare and only happen in slightly less than 5% of cases. By cons, panics partial (situations where at least one investor withdraws its funds in period 1) are quite frequent and are observed in 70% cases on average. However, the occurrence of these partial panic very much depends obviously on the group dynamics on the "long" term: if a group meets a few cases of panic at the beginning of the session in the early rounds, the trend is decreasing rather to Over time, the panic is rarer. The reverse is true for groups that start immediately, with rates of panic rather high, reinforcing the contrary phenomenon over time. So the lack of coordination tends to worsen when it is initially quite large and rather to disappear when it is initially quite limited.
Experience & Schotter Yorulmazer is somewhat more complex, but also corresponds better to the intuition, since in some treatments, participants' decisions are not simultaneous but sequential: I watch my neighbor remove or not in period 1, so I decide to withdraw or not in period 2, etc.. It corresponds to the idea that one can occur spontaneously as a potential problem of oil panic: I am especially trying to go full if I observe that there is a queue important than if I observe that there is nobody. These authors therefore explore the impact of information that can be given to saving on the severity level of bank runs. An important point is that they are also considering the role of the average pay for deposits - the level of interest rates-in the onset and intensity of bank runs.
The result is also reassuring that to observe the withdrawal of other investors tend on average to minimize the occurrence of bank runs early in the game, compared as a simultaneous game in Madiès. Moreover, the higher the pay is high, and the occurrence of panic early in the game is limited.
All of these experiences reveals another interesting result: the suspension of the possibility of withdrawing from public authorities to stop the panic once they start to trip, but their effectiveness in preventing of these panics is quite limited. Moreover, insurance mechanisms, even if they involve a moral hazard problem on the part of investors, limit severity of bank runs and play a role in crime prevention.
What worries me to return to the oil panic is that the insurance system seems somewhat limited (strategic reserves of fuel in the state are limited in number of days of use, and c is the only "insurance" that I see). There remains the suspension of fuel supplies. That is to say that I can do to prepare myself to take a few days of forced rest home ...
0 comments:
Post a Comment