The Best Unblocked Games

Facebook, gas prices and the role of approving

I read the newspapers very rarely. I always more or less hated this, perhaps in response to this period of my childhood when, during the rainy vacation days spent in my native Morvan, my only resource to fight against boredom was reading the Superman strips taken by the newspaper La Montagne ...

More generally, I always vaguely challenged this view the news through the small end of the telescope, which is more interested in the boules competition Petaouchnouk friendly-sur-Sevre that the conflict in Darfur, and these newspapers in which the major interest of many readers is to consult obituaries if his neighbor will be included.

[I am a little moody, probably disrupted by the switch to winter time]

However, there are few, having at my disposal one of the bibles of Breton medium (outside The Holy Bible of course), namely the newspaper Ouest France, I came across this little story present in the edition of 27 October I am going to narrate.

Once upon a time, in a small town of Ille-et-Vilaine, a nice head of station, named Eric. This was exposed, like all his fellows, the recurrent difficulties of fuel supply due to deposits blocked by hundreds of trade unionists - a dozen police said, opposed the pension reform.

Being of a generous nature, he said it would be desirable to inform all those poor motorists wandering like lost souls in search of the Grail container, not the blood of Christ, but good and heavy diesel. He then had the idea to inform them in real time (?) Via the Facebook page of the large area which holds the gas station. Alas, far from stopping there, noting that competitors' prices soar during this period of shortage, the margins from his post of about 1% to 6% for certain, he courageously decides to lower fuel prices it provides and, icing on the cake, to increase its capacity by hiring extras to limit the length of queues.
Result? dozens of messages of encouragement and appreciation for this welcome improvement and these generous prizes on the Facebook page of the supermarket. Eric, moved to tears (well, there I am a bit of a film) decides to organize a challenge : If before 8 am Tuesday, October 26, one hundred were clicked "love" on the popular Facebook page, the price of fuel down. But Eric goes further, if in addition to that, 800 Internet users say they are fans of the aforementioned page, diesel oil is sold at cost. Apotheosis: If the page has over 1000 fans, all fuels are at cost.

In fact, at the end of the period, 109 people said they "liked" it, and suddenly Eric, overwhelmed by an emotion that one can not declare legitimate decided to provide all fuel cost all day going far beyond its initial commitment. Therefore predictable supply disruption from 17.45 on the same day!

player, do you doubt that what I'm interested in here is to give a little economic sense in this paradox: a manager who agrees to sell at cost upon the fact that anonymous users have served him in sufficient numbers they were nice! Notes that many users may have said the friendly, it does not cost much and moreover, they may actually find it really unpleasant, but that's all that matters, is that ultimately, a sufficient number of people have reported finding its sympathetic action.

What I mean by that is that the power of retaliation by the Internet in case of non compliance with the floor manager is relatively limited. These are not 100 Internet, which, moreover, are not necessarily regular customers of the resort, which will be able to punish the manager by boycotting their station for example. Furthermore, one might think that an objective of building a reputation by the manager to its clients is probably real, but not necessarily the main motivation for his behavior.

The question is whether this type of reward ("I" on Facebook) or punishment ("I do not like") has a symbolic effect on the behavior of individuals. This idea is as old as the world or almost one of those who argued so serious as for example the sociologist Emile Durkheim.

These penalties / rewards are said to be immaterial (also known as positive or negative feedback in the experimental literature) in the sense that they do not affect the material welfare of the officer punished or rewarded, but only his emotional state. The examples are numerous, both possible expressions of approval and disapproval verbally and facially are many insults, social ostracism (see the sweet process of excommunication), humiliation (etc.) but also the applause the encouragement, smiles and other expressions of individual or collective enthusiasm with regard to the conduct of a person.

Initially I thought count by tens experimental studies devoted to this simple question, and it is clear that it is not so easy to find items which directly address this issue in the field of experimental economics or behavioral economics in this precise sense. Many studies exist on the impact of sanctions / reward material, also on the question of the impact of sanctions on symbolic contributions (including a paper known to one of my colleagues and co-authors, David and Masclet in Masclet al., 2003). However, feedback suggested - some level of disapproval of such non-material is always ex post, once the actual decisions of individuals made public for the whole group.

The only study to my knowledge on this subject is that of Perez-Lopez & deliberateness in 2010 in the Journal of Economic Psychology , the question raised by these authors is precisely my opinion the main outcome of the enigma of my sympathetic manager behavior gas station. How the presence of an approval or disapproval of a non-material can influence the choices?

To study this, the authors, after building a model of aversion to the disapprobation, compared three treatments based on a prisoner's dilemma game played once (one-shot game ") in order to test the theoretical model constructed initially. In this game , need I remind invented by Dresher and Flood in 1950, and contextualized by Tucker in 1952, two players must decide to cooperate or not cooperate (these terms are not used in the game instructions) The choice is simultaneous. If both cooperate, they each earn 180 points, and if both do not cooperate, they each earn 100 points. If one of them cooperates and the other not, one who earns 80 cooperates and who does not cooperate earns 260 points. The Nash equilibrium is obviously a mutual defection.

The first experimental treatment is a control treatment, participants are paired with two randomly and anonymously play the prisoner's dilemma. In the second treatment, made in particular to test their model aversion to disapprove, the subject must say this before choosing their strategy, what they think their opponent will think of their choice in all possible configurations of game, if they turn clear or approve each possible strategy. For example, assuming that the other cooperates, the fact that I cooperate myself should be overwhelmingly approved by my partner. This information will be the opponent, each player having access to this hypothetical judgment actions of the other by himself.

In the last treatment, players have the opportunity, once made their decision to send a message to their partner expensive ("Feedback"), this message saying that the choice made by the other was either good or bad or neither good nor bad. The treatment that interests me most is obviously the second treatment, based on the hope of being approved or disapproved by the partner.

The results are summarized briefly: the rate cooperation is higher in the treatment feedback (which is in line with the existing experimental studies on the impact of sanctions on non-material cooperation) than in the control treatment. Treatment "expectations" - expectations about what my opponent will think of my action - is intermediate, that is to say that the cooperation rate is slightly better than in the control treatment, although the difference is not statistically significant (on the graph below, the rate of participants who chose "cooperate" in terms of treatment, control treatment blue, orange treatment "expectations" and feedback processing in yellow).

Source: Lopez-Perez and deliberateness, 2010

Thus, only certain players are showers in disapproval, but clearly this is not the overwhelming majority of participants.

Finally, drivers of large area have been lucky to come across a manager who, fundamentally, is certainly not altruistic, but rather sensitive with respect to the other, motivated by a gesture approval of his peers, which admittedly is the case for many of us.

Painting Of A Man And A Woman

Threat of gasoline shortage? Do not panic (oil)! Discipline

NB: group of motorists desperate kindly asking alms oil)

The strike situation of employees in most major oil refineries, the strike resulting in a blockade of the outputs of refined fuels, augurs the possibility of a shortage of gasoline for most motorists who I am, the stations gradually being unable to renew their stocks.

As Dante wrote in Hell:

" Oh, she is nagging anxiety Driver's fuel shortage, looking for the grail diesel or unleaded, and ready to do battle with the CGT simplex homo, who in the early Frimat, and under the false pretext that he likes walking, finds nothing better than to march occasionally accompanied by thousands of similar (tens according to the prefecture of police) and to recover from his diabolical efforts , sleeping on fuel depots, but with one eye open, ready to pounce on the slightest scab ... "

[If someone comes to counting the number of commas in the preceding sentence, I sent him a caramel collect. Mostly I hope no one seriously believes that Dante wrote it, it's actually Victor Hugo in Les Miserables.]

The thing is, day after day, the media never stop not knocking our message, namely that the risk of fuel shortage is real, although the Government reiterates that there is no need to panic, and that is precisely a panic that would trigger the shortage.

Well for now, things seem to happen nicely, most stations have not forfeited and there seems to be no rush among distributors. However, since I have the opportunity to use my car every day, I must confess that I look with a touch of anxiety in the situation where I source stations regularly, waiting for messages "Out of Gas "or tonnage (no pun intended) the number of motorists filling their tanks, a queue fed giving the signal for a panic trying to develop. Therefore, my imagination probably much too rich considering the company collapsing and ending up in a death struggle to obtain a jerry can of gasoline, as in the post-apocalyptic world of Mad Max.

This kind of situation, which grows each time a paralysis of the road haulage threat applies to both fuel and foods, and we all remember the strike of 1993 during which total our (con) citizens heaped pounds of pasta, sugar and other items to survive in case of nuclear attack.

These phenomena of panic potential related to risk of default on supply basic necessities always make me think furiously to the phenomena of bank runs, a phenomenon brilliantly described in the book Kindleberger in 2000 on the history of financial crises and theoretically modeled by including Diamond & Dybvig 1983. These panics are a typical example of self-fulfilling prophecy, since it is precisely because an agent anticipates that he will trigger panic by withdrawing their savings (we'll use it with this description of the revolution, with its usual brilliance, by the poet Eric Cantona ) ....

Traditionally, the phenomenon of bank runs is modeled as a coordination game in which two equilibria are possible, one where everyone panics and withdraws its funds in a given bank (and therefore the logical first come first serve basis, and all investors will not be served) and one in which no panic (so no one withdraws its funds or to withdraw the last of the game if the horizon is finite). Clearly, this is interesting, but it's a bit of a response Normand, "perhaps have ben is that yes panic, but perhaps have well qu'non "...

Experimental economics is then very useful in those situations where the theory gives predictions of multiple, in that it allows to discriminate potentially empirically strategies adopted by players and try to understand their rationale.
Several experimental studies have been done on these phenomena, one of Madiès (2006), published in the Journal of Business , and one of Schotter and Yorulmazer in 2008 in the J ournal of Financial Intermediation .

Madiès In the study, one of the experiments is as follows. Groups of 10 participants must decide simultaneously to 30 times (rounds) for the period of withdrawal of their savings. If they withdraw all in period 2, each earns 45 ECUs. If they withdraw all in period 1, only 3 will be served, the bank became illiquid beyond 3. All three earn 40 ECU and the 7 others who have not withdrawn in period 1 win 0, whatever the time of withdrawal. In this game there is a Nash equilibrium Pareto-dominant one in which all 10 participants withdraw in period 2, well being are of 450 ECUs. There is another Nash equilibrium risk-dominant implies a lack of coordination, ie a situation in which the 10 participants withdraw in period 1, and where consequently the gain is 3 * 40 = 120 ECUs, with only 3 participants will served.

The results are partially "reassuring, in that the total panic (that is to say, situations in which the group of 10 investors withdrew their funds in period 1) are quite rare and only happen in slightly less than 5% of cases. By cons, panics partial (situations where at least one investor withdraws its funds in period 1) are quite frequent and are observed in 70% cases on average. However, the occurrence of these partial panic very much depends obviously on the group dynamics on the "long" term: if a group meets a few cases of panic at the beginning of the session in the early rounds, the trend is decreasing rather to Over time, the panic is rarer. The reverse is true for groups that start immediately, with rates of panic rather high, reinforcing the contrary phenomenon over time. So the lack of coordination tends to worsen when it is initially quite large and rather to disappear when it is initially quite limited.

Experience & Schotter Yorulmazer is somewhat more complex, but also corresponds better to the intuition, since in some treatments, participants' decisions are not simultaneous but sequential: I watch my neighbor remove or not in period 1, so I decide to withdraw or not in period 2, etc.. It corresponds to the idea that one can occur spontaneously as a potential problem of oil panic: I am especially trying to go full if I observe that there is a queue important than if I observe that there is nobody. These authors therefore explore the impact of information that can be given to saving on the severity level of bank runs. An important point is that they are also considering the role of the average pay for deposits - the level of interest rates-in the onset and intensity of bank runs.

The result is also reassuring that to observe the withdrawal of other investors tend on average to minimize the occurrence of bank runs early in the game, compared as a simultaneous game in Madiès. Moreover, the higher the pay is high, and the occurrence of panic early in the game is limited.

All of these experiences reveals another interesting result: the suspension of the possibility of withdrawing from public authorities to stop the panic once they start to trip, but their effectiveness in preventing of these panics is quite limited. Moreover, insurance mechanisms, even if they involve a moral hazard problem on the part of investors, limit severity of bank runs and play a role in crime prevention.

What worries me to return to the oil panic is that the insurance system seems somewhat limited (strategic reserves of fuel in the state are limited in number of days of use, and c is the only "insurance" that I see). There remains the suspension of fuel supplies. That is to say that I can do to prepare myself to take a few days of forced rest home ...

Fetal Weight Percentile

States budget, reform of the Stability Pact and efficiency Sanctions

Last Monday, the finance ministers of the EU-27 have discussed the necessary reforms to the Stability Pact. One of the sticking points at that meeting was apparently how financial penalties should be determined for the member states that would let them slip deficit and public debt because of lax economic policies. I quote a recent article Point published here so that everything is clear:

" Devoted to the issue of automatic sanctions and the criterion of reduction of debt, the meeting was to reconcile the positions of Germany, who advocates a hard line, that of the majority of states, including France, eager to preserve leeway.
Some question the overly automatic sanctions and the criteria to be used for examining the evolution of the debt. Others are reluctant to the very principle of financial penalties levied on EU funds "

In particular, Minister of Economy and Finance, Christine Lagarde said this:" France has always supported a strong and credible economic governance. From there to provide a fully automated nature, a power that would be totally in the hands of experts, not . In contrast, the German finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, as ECB President Jean Claude Trichet spoke in favor of a hardening material, in particular the German minister who publicly campaigned for sanctions "quasi-automatic ". Specifically, Mr. Schäuble has also insisted on the "automatic" penalties put in place for a debt or deficit exaggerated the lifting of sanctions to obey a "qualified majority reversed", that is to say that the penalties apply unless a majority of state are opposed. I confess that, initially, the position of this gentleman seemed much more sensible than the French position, being persuaded that the opportunity to vote on a discretionary basis for sanctions would limit the effectiveness or even completely negate mere possibility that they may exist.

So, to summarize, some member states, including France, defending the levels of penalties determined on a discretionary by a show-off states, while other states, not least because Germany is one of them, argue in favor of sanctions or quasi-automatic machines that would not rely on a political voting states. We're a little debate in the regulatory policies vs. discretionary policies ("rules Rather Than discretion, Kydland & Prescott 1977), the ultimate effectiveness of the system of sanctions is probably related to its credibility. However, it is not at all to this aspect I want to discuss today, but rather, more basic, the effectiveness of sanctions endogenous sanctions or exogenous (automatic) on fiscal restraint States.

This kind of situation in which states negotiate institutional arrangements that will govern them in the future lends itself to speculation or evidence. Especially here, where what is at stake is the effectiveness of specific devices of sanctions resulting from lax fiscal policy on the part of a Member State. In this case, it would be interesting for representatives of EU states who are currently discussing these points, have the chance to have a small presentation on the main results of the literature Experimental effectiveness of sanctions on the cooperation of agents. I will not do it now because it would take me too far, but just give some information on the following question: is it preferable to have the efficacy of automatic sanctions that would therefore not be chosen endogenously by Member States or, conversely, is it better that the award of sanctions against a Member State relies on a political process of voting discretion on the part of all Member States This case is based on having?

I will make a assumption that I understand it may seem questionable (and I have a problem too), but is particularly suited: the fact that each Member State shall respect the rules of the Stability Pact is akin to a public good that benefit all Member States, even though it may be individually expensive for a given Member State. Clearly, each state would benefit from being able to play stowaways and not follow the rules (make the budget deficit when he needs it, this significantly beyond 3%), but collectively, the effect would catastrophic, the absence widespread fiscal discipline leading to major economic problems for the eurozone. Just like the fact that a State which has committed at the international level does not negotiate with potential terrorists do it may quietly, prompting the terrorists to expand their business, to use the canonical example of Kydland and Prescott.

Tyran and Feld in 2006 led an experiment whose teachings are, if any, interest seems to me there. Their experiment, published in Scandinavian Journal of Economics , based a gambling problem contribution to a public good with penalties. The design of the experiment is however quite different from what is usually done on this issue. Indeed, many experimental studies on the effectiveness of sanctions in social dilemmas, and I helped myself, rely on endogenous penalties determined by individual participants who observe the level of contribution to public good of others. The canonical article on this kind of two-stage game, a contribution of sanctions and the following is the article by Fehr & Gaechter, 2000.
In their study, the situation is reversed. Participants first choose the terms of sanctions and then contribute. This experimental situation more or less corresponds to the current situation of the European Union, currently employed to decide the modalities of future penalties that would apply to Member States lacks fiscal discipline. It is therefore particularly interesting to note the results.
Penalties for insufficient contributions may be in some treatments, exogenous (that is to say, determined by the experimenter), and in others are endogenously chosen by a vote of the participants belonging to a group. In this case, the game is played in two stages: first the participants vote for the type of sanction they themselves attribute (no penalty, sanction or penalty moderately severe) and then, once the system of sanctions collective set, playing a game of classic contribution to public good (each member of a group of 3 has 20 tokens and must decide to allocate this endowment between a private account, and earns 1 point per token and a public account , and earns 0.5 points per token, but also reported 0.5 percentage point to the other two team members). Once the contributions chosen by each participant, the sanctions are applied. If the contribution to public good is equal to 20 (the whole allocation), there is no penalty. Otherwise, the penalty applies and takes two forms depending on the treatment, punishment and moderate to severe punishment. The penalty is to remove moderate gains 4 points in the participants did not contribute fully to the public good, and severe punishment is to deprive him fourteen points. For example, a participant who contributes 0 to the public good will in the case of treating "severe punishment", and assuming that the other two participants belonging to his group contribute fully, a gain of 20 +0.5 (40) -14 = 26 points.
From a theoretical perspective, the balance of such a game is the balance of free riding (all participants contribute zero to the public good) in case there is no sanction in the case where the penalty is moderate. In cases where the penalty is severe, the Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium has contrast in which the three participants contribute their entire endowment to the public good.
The main results are as follows. The chart below shows the average levels of contribution in percent (100% corresponding to a contribution of 20 tokens, which the Pareto optimal if everyone contributes here), this level of punishment for each:

source: Feld and Tyran, 2006

As Not surprisingly, the level of contribution increases with the level of sanction. But in fact, if sanctions are imposed exogenously (without a vote by the subjects), only severe punishment is efficient for the public good is produced at most. The penalty is moderate for its relatively inefficient, the level of contribution to public good is not significantly different level from a situation in which there is no penalty.
The results are quite different in the case of endogenous penalties, as shown in the following graph:

source: Feld and Tyran, 2006

The level of contribution is this time significantly even in the case of mild sanctions, equal to about 65% of the maximum possible, against only about 20% in the absence of sanctions. In the case of severe sanctions, it has no fundamental difference between contributions under this level of penalty to be voted by the participants or attached externally by the experimenter.
I will not say that every day, but it is clear, given these few results, I am compelled to agree with Christine Lagarde (arrghhh ...) It is better for sanctions policy as determined by the states Member of automatic sanctions, particularly if the level of sanctions is relatively moderate (one speaks of 0.2% of GDP). If sanctions are very strong, what seems to be the preferred option by Germany, then the procedure for determining sanctions is not very important. That it is a discretionary voting to decide to implement sanctions once observed behavior, or that one has an automatic sanction when a state member crosses the red line, sanctions will be effective to encourage States to contribute more to the public good.
However, I must emphasize that, as sanctions are costly, experimental literature emphasizes Detrimental effects of sanctions: the earnings of players can ultimately be lower if it is awarded on too strongly, and this may undermine the effectiveness economy. Besides, I already explained that such mechanisms can cause crowding intrinsic motivation of agents, extrinsic motivations (fear of the stick), replacing the intrinsic motivations (available natural agents to cooperate).
The sanction mechanism is handled with care and it is more than necessary to weigh the advantages and disadvantages.

PS: the picture that illustrates this post is taken from Gotlib, Topic in Brac, Volume 4 "Slowburn gag" with all my admiration and respect.