I recently read an article in Le Nouvel Observateur, which featured academic philosophers and other thinkers who used the TV series (Lost, The Sopranos, etc..) For support their argument their scientific and educational presentations (or here to illustrate my point). I want to say, dear editor of Nouvel Observateur, I was a little disappointed not to have been mentioned, annoys me that my readers with movies and other unlikely TV series more or less brilliant economic to illustrate my point. In the words of Calimero, a well-known Italian thinker in the years 70-80, "it's really not fair .. "
Bah, I will not be recognized until after my death (hopefully as late as possible) and my contribution will be finally estimated fair value, in the blogosphere economic equivalent without any doubt the work of Pascal Obispo in the pop world.
[Well, at the same time, my hope is modest ...]
The final season of Lost has just been released on a chain well known and one of the last episode inspired me to this post . During a crucial scene, Jacob, a mysterious character who is charged with protecting the island, says Sawyer, Hurley, Kate and Jack, he must find a volunteer to take the relay, its ability to protect island by ending little. He explained that if no volunteers among them do nominate, evil will sweep the world (I'm simplifying a bit but I do not want the barber may be interested reader to "Lost" as I'm looking for "Plus belle la vie"). Jack, as if struck by revelation for some time, proposes as a volunteer almost immediately, thus ending the dilemma of the small group of survivors gathered by Jacob.
We say that Jacob's andouille could have offered this choice earlier in the series, while most of the protagonists are dead. Indeed, making this proposal at a time when it is roughly four characters, it is less likely to obtain a voluntary agreement at the beginning of the series or even just this past season, potential volunteers being much more numerous.
Let us in the situation. Imagine you, reader, during a stroll along the Seine at Paris Plage sessions. In a dense crowd, you realize suddenly that a man fell overboard and was drowning. His name is Marcel, just Franche Comté and visits his stepmother ...
[ This has absolutely no interest but to cause a totally artificial suspense and give a bit of flesh about me to that you drive, you're hooked enough to go to the end of this long post ].
All present heard him shouting for help. Obviously, from what you could see is a beefy, probably around 1.90 m and 100 kg at least. There is a risk to try to attend: as it seems to be developing panic, it may well train with him struggling. Will you take the risk you take the plunge for save him or will you wait until someone has to take that decision for you? After all, you might think that, being very numerous, there is necessarily a person who will decide before you and will undoubtedly succeed in saving the man.
This phenomenon is described in the game's dilemma voluntary "( volunteer's dilemma ), presented by Diekmann in 1986. We talk about the volunteer dilemma insofar as it describes a situation where people prefer someone other than themselves is willing to do something, but still prefer be voluntary even if they can be sure that person is. The reader who wants details can usefully refer to any religion or my work in teaching microeconomics, and I use regularly in this blog, Markets, and Strategic Behavior games, Charles A . Holt.
[I light candles also for Charlie to our lady Paimpont every Sunday that God]
On a broader level, there is more likely to find a volunteer in a group to do something individually costly when the number of group members is high or low? Intuition push to answer that, the more people, the greater the chance of having at least one volunteer who appoint themselves is great.
This intuition is confirmed by a simple theoretical analysis. To explain the problem a little better, consider a huge crowd of two people and make the assumption that if the person is saved, every person in this crowd earns V. Everyone is anxious that the person in distress is saved and the save is a kind of well public. If I volunteer, it'll cost C (C may well represent an expected cost). If the person is not saved, each individual "wins" L. For there is no balance of rider in this game (ie a situation in which nobody saves the individual, which we would fall back on a very classical problem), assume also that VC is greater than L, which means that even if I bear the cost of rescue, my situation is better than having saved the situation where no one played the rescuers.
Given these assumptions, two equilibria (Nash) are possible asymmetric, one in which I am a volunteer and the other is not, and one in which I am not voluntary and the other is. Symmetrical situations in which there is no voluntary and where everyone is voluntary are not equilibria of the game
Moreover, as in all coordination games, there is a symmetric equilibrium in mixed strategies, in which each player has a probability pd'être voluntary and probability (1-p) not to be. Suppose there are n players. As a player, to determine the probability that I will agree to volunteer, I have to gain equivalent to volunteer that I gain as I hoped not to be. One can easily show that the probability for each player not to be voluntary:
The probability of an individual voluntary intuitively, decreases when C increases, increases when (VL) increases and decreases when n , the group size increases.
Therefore, the probability in a group of No players there is no volunteer (1-p) ^ n, either when using the above equation:
The probability there are no volunteers among n players thinks so with the group size (when n tends to infinity, this probability converges to the value of the ratio between C and V). From a theoretical viewpoint, the larger the group, the greater the probability that there are no volunteers increases, even if at a certain threshold size, it increases less rapidly .
The experimental evidence is quite intriguing about this game: the probability of an individual volunteer as observed seems to decrease with n, as predicted by the Nash equilibrium (first equation), but unlike theoretical model, the probability that there are no volunteers does not increase with n (so says the second equation).
The experimental evidence is quite intriguing about this game: the probability of an individual volunteer as observed seems to decrease with n, as predicted by the Nash equilibrium (first equation), but unlike theoretical model, the probability that there are no volunteers does not increase with n (so says the second equation).
Franzen example made in 1995 a series of experiments in which each participant must decide at once to volunteer or not to perform a certain task beneficial to all. Group size varies according to the experiments, other parameters remaining the same game (mainly V, C and L. The value of NAV is $ 100 and the value of C $ 50). One of its main findings is that the rate of volunteering (the ratio between the number of people who say they volunteer and the number of people in the group) decreases gradually as the group size increases. For example, for groups of two persons, the rate is 65% but for groups of 50, he is only 20%. This is consistent with the idea that the probability for an individual to volunteer with decreases No .
By cons, when the group size is n = 2, the frequency of the event "there is no voluntary" is about 12%. When n = 50, this frequency is close to zero. So there is always a voluntary empirically when the group size is large enough. Beyond a size of about 10 people, there is always someone who sacrifices himself for the common welfare (while the probability that there is no volunteer should converge to $ 50 / $ 100 or ½). When n = 4, as at the end of Lost, the probability that there are no volunteers to protect the island is about 7% according to the results of the experiment Franzen. It's small but significantly greater than zero.
short, Jacob would have something to offer the beginning of season 1 when the number of survivors on the island was great. But we must recognize that no one understood anything, and especially that it had no interest narrative, because the writers could not keep us in suspense for six seasons they have used to eliminate some of the survivors of the island.
Morality (experimental) to be drawn from this story is it is better to have sacrificed to designate a large crowd in a small group, you're more likely to be able to scroll.
On this important lesson of economic philosophy and everyday heroism, full of cynicism that I accept myself as hard, I think it is high time for me to go on holiday to rest my brain tired and tell you, reader, very soon for new adventures ...
On this important lesson of economic philosophy and everyday heroism, full of cynicism that I accept myself as hard, I think it is high time for me to go on holiday to rest my brain tired and tell you, reader, very soon for new adventures ...
