Angles In Real Life Project

The victory of the France team, televisions Kahneman-Tversky and reimbursed

Several commercial brands of supermarkets (including one with a name similar to Galaxy Venus) and brands of televisions offer to pay more or less partially purchases TV depending on the performance of the team of France in World football future in South Africa.
Arthur (Charpentier) has already mentioned this problem here . Well, if I want to do evil spirit, I would say the risk is not great for these signs appear. But as I said before, the thing footballing awakening my interest about as much as Peter Gabriel listening to the last title of Celine Dion, one must say that I feel unable to make myself a moderate on trial the magnitude of the risk taken by Venus Galaxy and others. Let

elements "objective".
probability "revealed by the victory of paris sport is, if I understood everything, one chance in 22 (France is given to winning 21 against 1).

[drive, I put quotation marks around "objective" because the use of the coast from Paris returns to the sport by definition contrary to the notion of subjective probability defined by Leonard Savage in the 50s]

If we consider the probability and the average budget for a TV purchase, say, 1000 euros, the expected loss for retailers who offer a full refund is about 45 euros, which you confess, reader, not much. This amounts to a discount of less than 5% on the price of nine. So the signs say we are all about marketing based on a spectacular but probably cheap at all ex ante.
course this expected loss has certainly been balanced with the demand response television to such an operation. This is not what I mean now, what interests me is you are slipping reader doubts, the perception of this operation by potential buyers and their incentive to buy these TVs. Well, I put aside the possibility that the buyer finds the sympathetic concerned that teachers support the blues by being willing to suffer a cost in case of victory, as this is surely the crux of the marketing operation. Suppose that the probability
revealed by paris sport is known enough buyers and represents a relatively rational assessment of the probability of victory for France. Will he act if the account on an expected gain of just under 50 euros may seem ridiculous?
The answer is probably positive. Thousands of people buy a daily ticket lottery tickets or other game based on chance when they face some cost by buying them is much higher than the expected gain, that is to say the probability of winning multiplied by the gain on success . If they adopted a decision on the basis of a comparison "rational" expected gains and losses, they would not buy, they buy or by being rational, it would mean that contrary to the national lottery would go to ruin a business perspective and financial. This is not the case, thank you for her, she is doing very well otherwise.
I put aside preferences vis-à-vis the risk to explain the daily behavior of paris. In fact, to rationalize such behavior, it should be assumed that most bettors are risk-lovers, which is not apparent, far from it, empirical studies. These lines, whether based on experimental data or field data, show instead that most people like you and me are risk averse and even highly risk averse (this is also the problem posed by the famous "equity premium puzzle (" enigma of the risk premium on shares, the yield spread between stocks and bonds in financial markets observed over a long period involving very high levels of "timidity" of investors).

One of the most plausible explanations for these behaviors, which may motivate the act of purchase in the case of televisions refundable in case of victory, is the distortion of probabilities by individuals (and not by their preferences vis- toward risk).

I mentioned the cumulative prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky in this post, and if reader, you need a refresh, you can go read ...

[Especially since the ticket in question is based on developments in the series "Lost" (translation of "lost" in English) that the final season of this series going on right time on a large national chain, and this post will do you absolutely no help to understand the tortuous twists enough of this final season, sorry.]

An interesting feature of this theory is that it stands the expected utility theory of Von Neumann & Morgenstern in that it raises the possibility that individuals distort probabilities. More precisely, in prospect theory, the concept of probability is replaced by a broader concept of "weight" (also proposed by Edwards in 1954), implying that weight in the presence of objective probabilities, they are transformed by individuals. This transformation has been proven time and again in the experiments, especially in the quasi-experiment of Allais in 1954 which highlights the effect of certainty, as explained elsewhere Kahneman and Tversky in their seminal article in 1979.
For example, if you are offered in a lottery which you can earn 1000 euros or nothing, depending on the outcome of throwing a coin (face wins, loses battery), it seems reasonable to assign a probability of 50% gain, which gives, assuming the individual neutral vis-à-vis the risk of an expected gain of EUR 500. However, experiments show that this objective probability of 50% is processed by most individuals in a weight (a "belief") smaller than 50%.
More generally, Drazen Prelec, starting from the experimental work, proposed in 1998 (in the journal Econometrica) a functional form of transformation of probabilities. This functional form is quite flexible, but adapts well to many experimental results which show that the weight of small probabilities tend to be more important than the weight of large probabilities (we tend to overestimate our chances of winning the lottery and to underestimate our probability of having a hangover after a drunken party to make a telling example). Roughly, it looks like this:

The dotted line represents the cumulative probability 0 to 1 and the red curve the weight given to objective probabilities. Small probabilities are overweighted effectively against major odds. For example, in the chart above, and assuming that my individual distorts the probabilities as shown in the red curve, the probability of winning is about 5% for the France team is transformed into a "belief" about 15%, a difference "subjective" objective of the order of 10 points.

In the example of Galaxy Venus, it seems obvious that we play here over to sell us televisions : The probability of winning is in fact very low, but the weight given to this probability, the belief that we give the win, probably even more distorted by our latent chauvinism, inevitably moves us to buy these TVs in stores that know very well handle our emotions and our inconsistencies.

Homemade Rabbit Playpen

Alosa Sipidissima Deep in Backing

hello all, yesterday Ausable Wulff and myself were at the riverside meadows (BC) at 3:30 am able to fish for shad lifts. ;

In the end we each dive 6 shad, fighting crazy for this magnificent fish. Releasing inevitable for ethics and good fly fishing beauty of this sport.

Alosa Sipidissima Video: Deep in Backing

Julien & Joscelin ;

Eloping And Bridal Shower Peggy Post

The Grenelle of the environment has given the renovation of housing a new impetus and, most importantly, a new color : Those of ecology. The tax provision for the implementation of energy conservation work has been strengthened. Overview of tax cuts, subsidies and other subsidies.

tax credits "sustainable development"

Many now work equipment that qualify for a tax credit: installing a condensing boiler, installation of mineral wool, recovery Rainwater ... The selection is wide! The complete list is contained in Article 200 quater of the General Tax Code (CGI). The advantage
is a reduction of income tax of 25-50% of costs (including VAT) until 31 December 2012, excluding the cost of labor. In addition, specificity of the mechanism of credit, if that amount exceeds the tax due it will be refundable.
are eligible homeowners, tenants, renters, occupants and even gratuitously, since 1 January 2009, landlords (1), provided they agree to rent the unit for at least five years.
The equipment must have a certain level of performance. These are detailed in Article 18a of Annex 4 of CGI. Finally, the amount of spending is capped by 5-year period, to 8,000 € for a single person and 16,000 € for a couple.

tax credit on the loan interest

To encourage housing construction certified Low Consumption Building (BBC), the legislature wished to encourage individuals who build or buy new homes to meet this label demanding. Provided they meet the same conditions as for the equipment tax credits, it is possible to enjoy a better rate of interest than for conventional buildings: 40% for 7 years (instead of 40% over one year, then 20% over four years).

Eco-interest loan

Since 1 April 2009 (2), banks are allowed to issue a particular type of interest loan, "said PTZ" green. " It is intended to support financing of energy optimization work. Notable difference with tax credits, it covers the cost of installation.
Lasting more than 10 years and a maximum amount of 30,000 €, it is accessible to owner-occupied housing, condominium, but also to donors and civil society, provided that the dwelling was built before 1 January 1990 and is intended for primary residence.
To obtain the agreement of the partner bank, three possibilities:
- focusing its project on rehabilitation of sewerage systems,
- to hire a consulting firm that heat will make a recommendation on the work that can guarantee a certain energy level,
- or for a "bunch of work": that is to say, making at least two types of work among a class of six, described in Article R.319-16 1 of the Code of Construction and Housing.
Note: For individuals who meet the conditions for the granting of a conventional PTZ, the amount may be increased up to 20,000 € if the dwelling meets the BBC label.

Eco-grant

The National Housing Agency (Anah) provides funding for low-income homeowners whose homes have more than 15 years. The aid may cover 20 to 35% of the amount of work, the cost should be between 1,500 and 13,000 €. To qualify for this grant, the owner must meet certain conditions and agree to occupy the unit for at least 6 years after work.

The booklet Sustainable development

This tax-free savings account was replaced on 1 January 2007 the former "Codevi. The fund, capped at 6,000 €, will come to support a loan application to perform work of saving energy in existing homes. The rate of pay of LDD is set at 1.25% since August 1, 2009. It will appeal to people who do not qualify for the Eco-PTZ, or who wish to purchase an additional loan.

Property Tax Exemption

some local (county, state or province) can now grant an exemption from property tax, in whole or by half, to the owners of the residence, built from 1 January 2009, is Certified BBC.

Finding the right people?

To learn which jobs may suit your home, request a personal consultation with advisors Area Info Energy ADEME (Agency for Environment and Energy Management Energy). For tax credits
: Contact your local tax office.
To Eco-PTZ: check with your bank.
To Eco-grant: Anah advisers can provide free information and send you the application form. www.ecosubvention.fr
For Property Tax: please contact your local council or your local tax office.

(1) Article 109 of the Federal
2009 (2) Article 244 quater CGI U was established pursuant to Article 99 of the LF, 2009, decree No. 2009-344 and No. 2009-346 of 30 March 2009

How To Turn The Ringer On An Atandt Phone

First outing of the season on the Devil. THE GREEN RIVER NYMPH

Hello everyone, welcome back after long months of absence, more motivated and dedicated to our passion, fly fishing.

To start the season, I find myself with Remi on the Devil's River, beautiful river. The water is very cold, we have not seen the shadow of a trout, but no matter the season starts. We will make a stop on Lake Tremblant try some streamer, and then we had the chance to stick a Muskie after three throws. Here are some pictures of the river Devil and the video of the catch Muskie.

Surprise from a Muskie Julian Favard we Vimeo.

Julien & Joscelin

Scorpio Man Never Txts

FASHION AND CHILDCARE CHILD SPANISH dominate the European market

FASHION AND INFANT THE SPANISH CHILDCARE DOMINATE THE EUROPEAN MARKET

sector has remained economically and posted sustained growth with a turnover of more than 930 million euros in 2008, or 7.4% more than last year.

English fashion infant therefore justifies a healthy economy despite the current economic situation deteriorated.

Thus, we emphasize that despite the threat of clothing imports from countries of southeast Asia, the English producers continue to grow thanks to their policy of differentiation. Promote values such as quality, competitiveness, excellence in service, highlighting new technologies and environmental assets are all highlighted by the entire sector of the English kids fashion.

Nationally, sales as they rose by 6.6% compared to 2007, 9.6% and even internationally.

An analysis of exports by country of destination, Italy, a country traditionally demanding in terms of fashion, is the main importer of type of product and attracts 63% of English production destined for overseas. This is followed by Portugal, the United Kingdom and France.

On the other hand, English companies seeking to diversify their export markets by turning to Russia or Poland.

at 2 ^e half of 2008, consumption of fashion products childhood in Spain amounted to almost 1.1 billion euros, with an average price of 11.25 euros per item .

Furthermore, in terms consumption habits, it appears that 25.30% of purchases are made in kids fashion from large retail chains mono-brand, ahead of multi-brand stores and specialty chains.

The kids fashion industry in figures:

In 2008, the sector has experienced significant growth in its activities. The total turnover was 608 million euros, which also assumed an increase of 0.44% compared al'année earlier. This result is divided by 460 million euros made at the national level (1.22%), and 148 million in exports (-1.9%). Invoicing National increased to 460 million euro (+1.22%).

Antique Kerosene Slide Projector

Crisis Greek Euro and play the weakest link

Europe seems currently mired in its difficulties in keeping the euro and the credibility of the currency against speculative attacks to one of sixteen member countries of the euro area, the case of Greece. The current problem is of course to avoid the default of the Greek state, but ultimately, the final problem is the credibility of the euro as international currency, at the height of the dollar or the yen ( little reminder here main facts ). Moreover, contrary to Nicolas Dupont Aignan I heard this morning on Europe 1 that calls out of the Euro, which seems to mix things up a point of view, we must distinguish the current level of euro vis-à-vis the dollar and its very existence. This post deals with the problem of existence the Euro, and not on the harm or benefits of an assumed exchange rate too high against the U.S. dollar.
Moreover, as this is not my cup of tea nor my field of expertise, I will address this problem in an indirect way and, as it does not make a monetary macroeconomics course, give a different perspective to the risk of taking the case through the small end of the telescope.
The problem of the Euro is that its existence is in part related to the behavior of member states of the area in the budget, conduct that was supposed to be supervised by the famous stability criteria adopted at the Maastricht Summit (3% maximum budget deficit relative to GDP, 60% ratio of public debt to GDP ratio in particular). Helping economic crisis, "they" (the EU, member states, etc..) Considered legitimate to loosen the grip at least for a very provisional. The existence of the euro and its level are also guaranteed by the European Central Bank, which, at least in part, holds the key to the monetary policy of the EU.
Fiscal policy is not regulated or less (currently) supranational level, it depends essentially discretionary attitudes of governments facing very serious economic difficulties. If no more EU Member State fails to meet the criteria of the Stability Pact, it can not be Euro, since the existence of the euro is partly made possible by the convergence of European economies (see this speech by Jean-Claude Trichet the Euro in 2002, perfectly clear on this subject).

From the moment the behavior again become potentially discretionary budget, which may be the outcome of this situation on Euro?

In fact, it is possible to assume that the single currency is a public good, not in the sense that it is necessarily good for the people who adopted it, but in the classical sense of public good, ie is an instrument of exchange convenient store of value and a standard measure that benefits all those who use it, without any possibility of excluding the use of certain agents and without the use that 'make economic agents may diminish the ability of other economic agents to use. Therefore, the credibility of the euro as currency unique in Europe can also be seen as a problem of contribution "individual" (member states) to a public good, public economics classical problem studied by any student lambda. The level of contribution may be apprehended by a level of effort or serious budget from each state member of the Euro Area, an effort that benefits everyone because it ensures the credibility of'Euro as single currency Union. I have already submitted this issue multiple times (I even feel a bit rambling and good but at the same time is something I know a little), especially in this ticket for my recent readers or for those who have forgotten the nature of this classic economic problem.

However, people usually tend to exhibit this problem by having in mind a certain "technology" of producing the public good. For example, assume that the level of public good is the sum of the contributions or efforts of each individual player. Clearly, to adapt it to the problem of the Euro, we could say that the single currency is all the more solid (hence the level of public good would be even larger) that the total efforts of member countries in Budget is important. If all countries are fiscally rigorous, it can not be any speculative attack against the Euro, and the benefit derived from the Euro by all member states is maximum. If no one made any effort, no one believes in the Euro and the Euro can not exist, the public good is not produced.
If we adopt this idea that the level of public good is the amount of effort, then it means that the least serious of Greece such as the budget can be balanced by the more serious example of Germany , leaving the level of public good unchanged.
It is clear that, although overall, the Member States are currently more expensive all together a budget point of view, helping economic crisis in the financial crisis caused by the alleged potential default of Greece, the fact that some member states of the euro are more stringent budgetary matters do not seem to curb the enthusiasm of speculative attacks against the currency. Everything happens as if the speculators felt that the least significant crack in the wall "Euro" was a sign of weakness most advanced. Clearly, the strength of the euro as single currency depended on credible the situation of the weaker member states on budgetary matters, and not a situation "average" of the EU consists of states with budget heterogeneous situations.

In the 80s, Jack Hirschleifer proposed various possibilities in technology to produce a public good (see here ). One that interests me today as part of this crisis is the technology known as the weakest link (weakest link Mechanism "in English in the text). In this game

contribution to public welfare, the level of public good is not determined by the sum of efforts individual contribution, but by the minimum of effort chosen by the players. Hirschleifer illustrates his point with an example of a dam: the dam is a public good that benefits all and which I can not exclude anyone, but if the height or the strength of the dam is run by a community of individuals who must choose independently the effort he must to build or maintain the dam, so it's just that my neighbor built his share of dam height of 20 cm for my effort, even if it exceeds 20 cm construction on my plot, not used to anything. The resistance level of the dam corresponds to the 20 cm of my neighbor, even if we all built a dam on our 2 m plot. Therefore, the level of public good is determined by the minimum of individual efforts.

[drive, I have this image of the game show "weak link", which corresponds only very roughly to the game described above (although candidates eliminate other candidates according to their rate wrong answers, wrong answers slowing the accumulation of gains for the whole team, but we must note that this is an unattractive, right?]

From a theoretical point of view, We know that when the production technology of public good from an amount of effort, the equilibrium of this game is the famous problem of "free rider" or stowaway: it is rational from one point of view of individual contribute nothing to the public good, and therefore the equilibrium (Nash, but also a dominant strategy equilibrium in terms of game theory), the public good is not produced, this which is bad in terms of welfare.
When you're in a situation of production of public good depends on the minimum individual contributions, things are a bit more complicated a theoretical point of view. In fact, the equilibria (Nash) game are multiple (say it is a game of coordination), but each equilibrium corresponds to a contribution of symmetric players: in these equilibria everyone makes the same effort level. If Greece is not serious budgetary, balance is that France or Germany is not serious in the same proportions. If France is "seriously" at a level x , Greece is at the same level as Germany.
Consider an example to better understand is actually very simple. Suppose two agents (1 and 2) has an endowment of wealth equal (60 points) and that each must choose to allocate this amount between a private good that is worth 1 euro per item and a public that pays for each 1.5 euro multiplied by the minimum of the two contributions to the public good. The gain of each player is:

Where xi is the contribution of i to the public good.
's simplify the situation further by assuming that players can only contribute zero to sixty points to the public good. The payoff matrix is as follows:

There are two Nash equilibria here, one is Pareto optimal (yield maximum efficiency), the one where everyone contributes his entire endowment, where the other person does not contribute to public welfare, and is worse (the balance of free riding) in terms of efficiency (measured here by the sum of earnings of the players), but the situations in which agents help each other everything and nothing are the most catastrophic point of view of welfare. Better than no help in this game than having only one person who contributes and one that contributes nothing.

Hirschleifer himself with Glenn Harrison produced the first experiments on this set of weak link in 1998 (the paper is available here ). More recently, Eric Malin, David Masclet and myself have conducted a series of experiments on this topic. The game was very close to that described above (4 players instead of 2, each player has 20 points, the game repeated 20 times with different parameters but leading to the standard theoretical prediction that there is a multiplicity symmetric equilibrium as explained above. Especially welfare group 4 players is maximum when all the world affects all of his 20 points in the public good). Some results are as follows, including the evolution of the average individual contribution to the public good throughout the periods played by the participants:

Source: Denant-Boemont, Malin & Masclet (2007), unpublished data.

Clearly, the level of average individual contribution to the public good is rather low and decreases with repetition of the game, while a theoretical viewpoint, the outcome is enough known (see above). In particular, a theoretical point of view, nothing was said that the balance of free riding (do not contribute) was more likely than other possible equilibria. The attraction of this equilibrium seems quite strong in terms of results. This is easily understood: if the public good is determined by the minimum of the individual efforts of members of my group, so it is risky for me to potentially contribute more than others, hence the attraction of the strategy " nothing to contribute "*.

Finally, if the existence of the Euro in the current situation is comparable to a public good problem with a weak link, the strength of the currency being linked to the minimum effort on the budget of the Member States participating in the Euro zone, and without wishing to be a Cassandra, I do not reassured about the outcome potential of this financial crisis and political governance.

*: for readers, including game theory, then there also exists in this game a risk-dominant equilibrium in the sense of Harsanyi & Selten in which players do not contribute anything. This is obviously a central element for explaining the experimental results.